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The technical definitions of certain crimes are often confusing to the general
public. Take, for example, New York State’s crime of “depraved indifference
murder.”  In one of these cases, a New York Times headline declared that the
“Jury Picked Wrong Crime in Murder Case.”1 That case, the first murder in the
recorded history of the town of Shelter Island, Suffolk County, read like every
citizen’s worst nightmare—a murder conviction reversed, and the criminal re-
leased from his prison cell “despite—indeed, in part because of—strong evidence
that [the defendant] intended to kill [his] victims.”2  Isn’t that exactly what
should lead to a conviction for murder, the average New Yorker might justifia-
bly wonder?  Had the defendant been convicted of murder, the answer would be
“yes.”  Depraved indifference, however, is another story.
In People v. Campbell, the Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second
Department, affirmed the depraved indifference murder conviction of Jarvis
Campbell.3  The case arose out of Campbell’s role in the shooting death of Deme-
trius Wright in Brownsville, Brooklyn.4  This comment contends that because the
evidence at trial revealed that the defendant intended to cause Wright’s death,
the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for de-
praved indifference murder.  More importantly, this comment argues that in af-
firming Campbell’s conviction, the appellate division relied on a case, People v.
Fenner,5 which had been overruled sub silentio.  The appellate division’s reliance
on Fenner is particularly troublesome because it represents the resurrection of a
defunct conceptual framework for analyzing the crime of depraved indifference
murder embodied by the case of People v. Sanchez.6  The Sanchez framework
erroneously focused on the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct rather
than the defendant’s mental state at the time the crime was committed.
In Campbell, defendant Jarvis Campbell was seeking information about a
man named “Born.”  Born had allegedly stabbed Campbell’s brother the night
before.  Campbell approached Demetrius Wright, Kareem Durham, and Jamel
Bascomb in broad daylight.7  After a brief exchange, Campbell reached into his
waistband and pulled out a gun.8  As the men were running away, Campbell
aimed his weapon in their direction and fired five rounds.9  According to an
1. Leslie Eaton, Jury Picked Wrong Crime in Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2004, at B1.
2. People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 217 (2005) (G. B. Smith, Rosenblatt & R. S. Smith, JJ., concurring).
3. 826 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2d Dep’t 2006).
4. Id. at 268.
5. 61 N.Y.2d 971 (1984).
6. 98 N.Y.2d 373 (2002).
7. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
8. Id. at 269.
9. Id.
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eyewitness, Campbell smiled while shooting at the men.10  One of the bullets hit
Wright in the back of the head and he died shortly thereafter.11
Campbell was indicted on charges of intentional murder in the second degree
and depraved indifference murder in the second degree.12  As alleged in the in-
dictment, a defendant is guilty of intentional murder when he causes the death of
another person with intent to cause the death of such person.13  In the alterna-
tive, a person is guilty of depraved indifference murder when he recklessly causes
the death of another person under circumstances evincing depraved indifference
to the value of human life.14  The trial court held that there was a reasonable
view of the evidence which could have supported a finding of recklessness, and
therefore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the depraved indifference
count.15  After closing arguments, both counts were submitted to the jury.16  The
jury acquitted Campbell of intentional murder, but convicted him of depraved
indifference murder.17
Campbell appealed to the Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second De-
partment.18  He argued that the evidence at trial was only consistent with an
intentional killing and that the evidence of depraved indifference murder was
both legally and factually insufficient.19  The appellate division unanimously af-
firmed his conviction.20  In its decision, the court summarized the path of New
York’s modern depraved indifference jurisprudence and concluded that this case
fell within the narrow band of conduct properly considered depravedly indiffer-
ent.21  The court analogized Campbell’s conduct to the defendant in People v.
Fenner.22  The court reasoned that because Wright was “simply” accompanied by
two other men at the time of his death, and because “there was no evidence of any
dispute between the defendant and the decedent, that the defendant even knew
the decedent, or was provoked before he shot and killed the decedent,” the jury’s




13. N.Y. PENAL § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2004).
14. Id. § 125.25(2).
15. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 268.
19. See id. at 269.
20. Id. at 268.
21. See id. at 269–71.
22. Id. at 270.
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and not contrary to the weight of the evidence.23  Campbell was sentenced to a
term of twenty-one years to life imprisonment.24
In New York, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when,
among other things, he causes the death of another person either intentionally25
or by recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.26  A
person acts “intentionally” when his conscious objective is to cause that result.27
Conversely, a person acts “recklessly” when he is aware of, and yet consciously
disregards, a grave risk that such result will occur.28  Furthermore, the risk must
be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation.29
Originally, the state of depraved indifference jurisprudence in New York
was governed by the 1983 case of People v. Register.30  Giving additional gui-
dance in interpreting the text of the statute, this controversial31 decision empha-
sized that the core mens rea of depraved indifference was simple recklessness.32
Furthermore, “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life”
were satisfied by an objective determination that the degree of risk created by the
defendant’s reckless conduct “convert[ed] the substantial risk present in man-
slaughter into a very substantial risk of death.”33  Thus, under Register, this
additional element of depraved indifference murder formed neither part of the
mens rea nor the actus reus of the crime of second degree murder; rather, it served
to define the factual setting necessary to elevate manslaughter (a merely reckless
killing) to murder (a reckless killing committed under circumstances evincing a
23. Id. at 270. See generally People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 642–44 (2006) (restating standard of review
for conducting weight-of-evidence, as opposed to legal sufficiency, analysis).
24. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corrections, Inmate Population Information Search, http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/
GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130 (enter Jarvis Campbell, or his department identification number, 03-A-
3421).
25. N.Y. PENAL § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2004).
26. Id. § 125.25(2).
27. Id. § 15.05(1).
28. Id. § 15.05(3).
29. Id. Note that while disregarding a merely “substantial and unjustifiable” risk is sufficient to establish
default recklessness under Section 15.05(3), liability for depraved indifference murder attaches only upon
the disregard of a “grave” risk of death under Section 125.25(2).
30. 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983).
31. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Depraved Indifference Murder Prosecutions in
New York: Time for Substantive and Procedural Clarification, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 455 (2005); see
also  Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 429 (1990).
32. Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 274.
33. Id. at 276–77.
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depraved indifference the value of human life).34  It was also generally acknowl-
edged that evidence establishing a defendant’s guilt of an intentional shooting
could not support a conviction for depraved indifference murder,35 because an act
“is either intended or not intended; it cannot simultaneously be both.”36  Thus, it
remained a hallmark of Register ’s jurisprudence that “the question of the defen-
dant’s state of mind [was] a classic matter for the jury.”37
As noted, however, Register was a controversial decision.38  By emphasiz-
ing an objective inquiry into the circumstances that evinced a depraved indiffer-
ence to human life, the court invited juries to engage in an impermissible
retrospective analysis which elevated the fact that the victim actually did die over
the indicia that this particular risk was “very substantial.”  Furthermore, by em-
phasizing the distinction between a “grave” risk and a merely “substantial” risk,
the court flirted with a vague line that was often difficult for juries to consist-
ently distinguish.  In fact, this terminology was characterized by a federal court
as a distinction without a difference.39
The first sign of Register ’s impending demise occurred when a deeply di-
vided New York Court of Appeals split four-to-three in affirming the depraved
indifference murder conviction of Oswaldo Sanchez.40  It was evident in the dis-
sent of Judge Rosenblatt that a new force had emerged on the court that was
eager to rectify Register ’s perceived flaws.41  Subsequently, in two separate lines
of cases, the Court of Appeals began to alter the way that it approached depraved
indifference murder cases.42  The first thread, which arose under Policano v.
Herbert, did not change settled precedent but rather reaffirmed the rule set forth
in People v. Wall, which held that evidence of “an intentional shooting” could
not, as a matter of law, support a conviction for depraved indifference murder.43
Thus, the first line of cases held that “evidence of a manifestly intentional killing
cannot sustain a conviction for depraved indifference murder and is based . . . on
the well-established rule . . . that intentional murder and depraved indifference
murder are inconsistent crimes.”44  In accord with this reasoning, the depraved
indifference murder convictions of several defendants were reversed “despite—
34. Id. at 276.
35. People v. Wall, 29 N.Y.2d 863, 864 (1971).
36. People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525, 529 (1987).
37. Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588, 599 (2006).
38. See  sources cited supra note 31.
39. See Jones v. Keane, 329 F.3d 290, 294 (2nd Cir. 2003) (quoting Jones v. Keane, 2002 WL 33985141, at
*5).
40. People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 417 (2002).
41. See id. at 394–416 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
42. See Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588, 605 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. (citing People v. Wall, 29 N.Y.2d 863 (1971)).
44. Id.
449
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indeed, in part because of—strong evidence that they intended to kill their
victims.”45
In the second thread, which arose, among other cases, under People v. Fein-
gold46 and People v. Suarez, and which actually did change settled precedent,
the court rejected Register ’s core holding that the existence of circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human life turned on an objective assessment
of the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct.47  In its place, the court
held that “depraved indifference” constituted a separate mens rea, distinct from
the original mens rea of simple recklessness.48  Accordingly, a defendant’s conduct
would need to be found “so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so
devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy,” as to morally
equate their behavior with that of a defendant who intentionally causes the death
of another person.49  These buzzwords became the new standard for defining the
heretofore non-existent mens rea of “depravity.”
It is axiomatic that the existence of the intent to kill another person conclu-
sively defeats the inference that the defendant also acted with a reckless disregard
of a grave risk of death; the two mental states are mutually exclusive.50  As such,
it is now clear that a person who intentionally causes the death of another person
may not be convicted of depraved indifference murder in the death of that person,
even if the jury acquits the defendant on the intentional murder count.51  A re-
view of the evidence in Campbell, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the people,52 reveals that Campbell’s conduct could not have “as a
matter of law, constitute[d] depraved indifference murder”53
The defendant’s conduct possessed all the hallmarks of an intentional homi-
cide: the chronology of the transaction, the number of shots fired, the defendant’s
facial expressions, the fact that one of the bullets hit the victim in the back of the
head, the lack of threat posed to the defendant by the victims, and the motive
involving the defendant’s brother all support the finding that this was an inten-
tional killing.54  Had the jury convicted Campbell of intentional murder instead
45. People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 217 (2005) (G. B. Smith, Rosenblatt & R. S. Smith, JJ., concurring).
46. 7 N.Y.3d 288, 296 (2006).
47. See Policano, 7 N.Y.3d at 606 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
48. See Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 296; Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 214.
49. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 211 (citing People v. Russell, 91 N.Y.2d 280, 287–88 (1998)).
50. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 1 N.Y.3d 464, 468 (2004); People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525, 529–30
(1987). Cf. People v. Wall, 29 N.Y.2d 863, 864 (1971) (considering the possibility of simultaneously
acting both intentionally and negligently).
51. People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 270 (2004).
52. See generally People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 (1983) (explaining the standard of review for the
legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal trial) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
53. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 216.
54. As examples of very similar fact patterns resulting in affirmed convictions for intentional murder or
attempted murder. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 768 N.Y.S.2d 211, 211 (1st Dep’t. 2003) (“Defendant’s
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of depraved indifference murder, it is likely that the conviction would have been
summarily affirmed on appeal.  However, Campbell was acquitted of intentional
murder and convicted of depraved indifference murder.55  Thus, the appellate
division was left to determine whether “a correct interpretation of the depraved
indifference murder statute [permitted] his conviction of that crime to stand.”56
The appellate division relied upon several factors in affirming the jury’s
verdict that the defendant possessed the culpable mental “state”57 to convict him
of depraved indifference murder: the lack of an identifiable plan in carrying out
the shooting spree, the number of shots fired, the lack of evidence of a dispute
between the defendant and the victim, and most importantly, the fact that the
victim’s companions were endangered during the course of the shooting spree.58
With the exception of the last factor, none of these remaining facts satisfy the
Court of Appeals’s narrowing definition of depraved indifference murder.59
Under its framework, the facts of Campbell are consistent only with an inten-
tional shooting.
The fact that a shooting was committed spontaneously, rather than pursuant
to a scheme or plan, does not necessarily support an inference of recklessness as
opposed to intentionality.  It was recognized in People v. Payne that “inten-
tional murder does not require planning or contrivance.”60  New York’s require-
ment of premeditation in an intentional murder prosecution was abandoned with
the adoption of the 1967 Penal Law.61  Moreover, the fact that Campbell fired
multiple shots is not probative of recklessness; “firing more rounds . . . does not
homicidal intent could be readily inferred from the fact that he fired numerous shots at the fleeing vic-
tim.”) (emphasis added); People v. Campbell, 617 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (2d Dep’t. 1994) (detailing a case
where the defendant shot at fleeing persons with whom he had previously had an altercation).
55. See  People v. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (2d Dep’t 2006).
56. People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 217 (2005) (G. B. Smith, Rosenblatt & R. S. Smith, JJ., concurring.).
57. The appellate division’s use of the term ‘mental state’ in its singular tense is technically incorrect.  The
Court of Appeals “depart[ed] slightly from the Register formulation . . . [to] make clear that the addi-
tional requirement of depraved indifference had meaning independent of the gravity of the risk.” Suarez,
6 N.Y.3d at 215.  By doing so, the Court of Appeals created an additional culpable mental state of “de-
praved indifference to human life” which exists co-extant with recklessness, the traditional culpable
mental state necessary for depraved indifference murder.  People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 296 (2006).
As such, the appellate division failed to clearly identify which of the requisite culpable mental states it was
then analyzing.  For purposes of this comment, however, I am contesting only the appellate division’s
conclusion that Campbell’s conduct was reckless, as opposed to intentional.
58. See Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 270–71 (citing People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971 (1984)).
59. Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588, 599 (2006) (noting its quasi-recognition that it no longer, post-
Sanchez, adhered to Register ’s paradigm with respect to “the question of the defendant’s state of mind
[being] a classic matter for the jury”).
60. People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 270 (2004).
61. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 299 (1976).
451
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make the act more depravedly indifferent, but more intentional.”62  Indeed, the
Payne majority rejected the attempt to create a per se rule permitting dual-count
submissions of depraved and intentional murder whenever the defendant’s con-
duct was not “overtly intentional.”63  Thus, the appellate division incorrectly fo-
cused on Campbell’s lack of planning and multiple shots as an indication of
recklessness.  In fact, this was the very argument rejected by the Court of Appeals
in Payne.64  As such, it should have been rejected by the appellate division.
The appellate division also relied on the lack of motive evidence as a basis
for sustaining the legal sufficiency of the depraved indifference murder verdict.65
However, the Court of Appeals has never held motive to be an indispensable
component of intentional murder.66  Even if motive were necessary to establish
intentionality, the record substantially showed that the defendant’s brother was
stabbed the night before the shooting, allegedly by the very same man Campbell
was seeking information about on the night he committed murder.67  Moreover,
the confrontation between Campbell and his victims prior to the shooting is simi-
lar to the encounter in People v. Gonzalez, where the court overturned a de-
praved indifference conviction.68  In that case, the defendant entered a Rochester
barbershop, secretly conferred with a person present therein, left and then later
returned to the barbershop.69  Upon his return, he proceeded to shoot the victim
multiple times without evidence of provocation or motive.70  Notwithstanding
the lack of obvious motive, the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that
Gonzalez’s homicidal actions were “specifically designed to cause the death of the
victim” and therefore reversed his conviction for depraved indifference even
though the jury had acquitted the defendant of intentional murder.71  Thus, the
post-Sanchez depraved indifference jurisprudence leaves no room for the specu-
lation engaged in by the appellate division in Campbell (i.e., “a rational jury
62. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d at 272 (“[I]t should be obvious that the more the defendant shoots . . . the victim, the
more clearly intentional is the homicide.”).  This means that what was self-evident to the Court of Appeals
in 2004 was apparently not clear to the appellate division in 2006.
63. Id. at 270.
64. Id.
65. People v. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (2d Dep’t 2006).
66. E.g., People v. Sangamino, 258 N.Y. 85, 87 (1932) (“[M]otive is not an essential ingredient of the crimes
of murder in the first and second degrees. Murder in either of these degrees may be committed without a
motive, but never without intent.”) (citing People v. Dinser, 192 N.Y. 80, 85 (1908)); People v. Ryan,
658 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (3d Dep’t. 1997); People v. Walton, 621 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1st Dep’t. 1995).
67. See Campbell, 826 N.Y.2d at 270; Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 15–16, People v. Campbell, 826
N.Y.2d 267 (2d Dep’t.  2006) (No. 2003-04039) 2004 WL 5042320; Respondent’s Brief at 3, People v.
Campbell, 826 N.Y.2d 267 (2d Dep’t.  2006) (No. 2003-04039), 2005 WL 4909106.
68. 1 N.Y.3d 464 (2004).
69. Id. at 465.
70. Id. at 465–66.
71. Id. at 467, 469.
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could  reasonably conclude that. . .”) with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence
of recklessness.72
Further, in Policano v. Herbert, the defendant shot and killed the victim
at a bus stop in Fort Greene, Brooklyn, in an act of violence which was charac-
terized by the court as having “erupted spontaneously after a chance encounter on
the street.”73  As in Campbell, Policano was convicted of depraved indifference
murder on a dual-count submission.74  Also as in Campbell, there was “consider-
able doubt that [Policano] acted with premeditation or sought out [the victim] to
seek revenge” when he fired multiple shots at close range.75  Further, the people’s
argument in Policano focused on the spontaneous nature of the act, coupled with
the evident lack of premeditation, to argue that a rational jury could find that the
defendant’s conduct demonstrated depraved recklessness, as opposed to intention-
ality.76  Unlike the appellate division in Campbell, however, the Court of Ap-
peals unanimously, and emphatically, rejected the people’s argument in Policano
stating that “there is no doubt that under the law of New York today, a jury
would not be permitted to find defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder
on the evidence in this record.”77  As such, the defendant’s depraved indifference
conviction was overturned.
The one fact that complicates the Campbell analysis was the presence of
endangered bystanders during Campbell’s “shooting spree.”  The thrust of the
Court of Appeals’s recent depraved indifference jurisprudence has focused on
“one-on-one encounters.”78  While the case of People v. Gonzalez stands for the
proposition that the mere presence of a bystander is insufficient, on its own, to
support a depraved indifference murder conviction,79 it remains that the court
has, on several occasions, “differentiated cases [presenting a one-on-one encoun-
ter] from homicides in which a defendant lacking the intent to kill 80 (but obliv-
ious to the consequences and with depraved indifference to human life) shoots into
a crowd or otherwise endangers innocent bystanders.”81 In Campbell, the appel-
72. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (emphasis added).
73. 7 N.Y.3d 588, 601 (2006).  After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, 725 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2001), Poli-
cano sought collateral relief from the federal courts wherein he was awarded a writ of habeas corpus sub
nom. Policano v. Herbert, No. 02-CV-1462, 2004 WL 1960203 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004), aff’d 430
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005).  Thereafter, the Second Circuit recalled its mandate and certified questions of
state law for resolution by the Court of Appeals in Policano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2006),
prompting this most recent discussion of the subject.
74. See Policano, 7 N.Y.3d at 592.
75. Id. at 601.
76. Id. at 592.
77. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
78. See People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 272 (2004); People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 218 (2005).
79. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 213 n.7.
80. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
81. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d at 271 (emphasis added).
453
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late division held that the presence of bystanders transformed the case from an
intentional, execution-style murder, into one eligible for “the narrow category of
cases where depraved indifference murder properly applies.”82
The appellate division erred in relying on People v. Fenner to hold that the
presence of bystanders was sufficient to support a depraved indifference murder
conviction, especially where, as in Campbell, the shooter intended to kill.  This is
because the Court of Appeals has explicitly repudiated this reasoning in the sec-
ond thread of post-Sanchez cases, highlighted by Feingold and Suarez.83
In order to hold that Fenner was still good law, and thus be able to apply
Fenner’s reasoning to the facts of Campbell, the court pointed to Payne’s ap-
proval of Fenner—despite arguments that the post–Sanchez cases had overruled
Fenner sub silentio.  This is important because Fenner is factually similar to
Campbell, and the people cited Fenner as a basis to affirm in Campbell.84
Fenner, however, was merely cited by Payne as an example of the proposition
that the presence of endangered bystanders does not necessarily connote depraved
recklessness85—a proposition that was firmly established by Register and
Sanchez; cases that remained good law at the time Payne was decided, but not
when Campbell was decided. Fenner broke no new ground, and because the
Payne majority did not carry sufficient votes to overrule Register and its prog-
eny, it properly relied on cases that were still good law at the time of Payne.86
Fenner’s continued viability turns largely on the courts’ continued adher-
ence to the conceptual framework of Register and Sanchez.87  In fact, a compar-
ison of the facts and reasoning in Sanchez and the opinion in Campbell reveals
the extent to which the latter tracks the former.  In Sanchez, the defendant shot
and killed his girlfriend’s sister’s boyfriend, with whom he had previously been
friends.88  Despite the powerful evidence of intentionality,89 a divided court af-
firmed the depraved indifference murder conviction, reasoning, in part, that the
defendant’s “sudden shooting of the victim . . . [from]. . . behind a door and
fir[ing] into an area where children were playing . . . presented[ed] a heightened
risk of unintended injury.”90  Thus, the majority found that a “rational jury
82. People v. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (2d Dep’t. 2006).
83. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
84. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d at 271.
85. See id. at 271.
86. Indeed, Fenner was decided summarily by memorandum.  Of its two paragraph discussion, half is de-
voted to the defendant’s unrelated Fourth Amendment challenges to his conviction. See  People v. Fenner,
61 N.Y.2d 971, 973 (1984).
87. Fenner, insofar as relevant, rests exclusively on Register. See id at 971–73.
88. People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 375–76 (2002).
89. Id. at 384 (“[Sanchez’s] conduct involved such a high risk of death that it could also lead to the conclusion
that it was intentional. . . .”).
90. People v. Hafeez, 100 N.Y.2d 253, 259 (2003) (describing the factual setting found in Sanchez).
454
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could  have harbor[ed] a reasonable doubt that the homicide of [the victim] was
intentional.”91
The same refrains were repeated by the appellate division in Campbell.92
The court panel emphasized, for example, that by viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution a “rational jury could reasonably conclude
that the defendant did not care whether harm would result when he commenced
his shooting spree in the direction of the fleeing men.”93  As can be seen, the
Campbell court’s extreme deference to the jury’s verdict, and the inferences and
speculation necessary to accomplish that goal, is really an application of Sanchez ’s
deference to the jury disguised as an application of Payne’s consideration of inno-
cent bystanders.94
The rule of Sanchez, however, was decisively abandoned by a majority of
the Court of Appeals in Feingold, which was decided over four months before
Campbell.95  Furthermore, in “conclud[ing] that the law has changed to such an
extent that People v. Register and People v. Sanchez should no longer be fol-
lowed”96 the court abandoned Sanchez, in toto, including the part that relied on
the presence of endangered children as the basis for upholding the depraved indif-
ference murder conviction.97  Subsequently, the court indicated its intention to
abrogate that part of Sanchez that relied on the presence of the endangered chil-
dren: “That a large number of people were endangered does not mean that defen-
dant was depravedly indifferent.”98  Given this strong statement, and its
unanimous reaffirmation by the Policano court,99 surely the appellate division
91. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d at 377 (emphasis added).
92. People v. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (2d Dep’t. 2006) (“The determination of the trier of fact
should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the
record.”).
93. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
94. Campbell is actually inconsistent with Payne, despite its reliance thereon, because it fails to apply the
“perceptible, evolving departure from the underpinnings of depraved indifference murder as expressed in
Register and Sanchez.” Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588, 603 (2006).  Principally, it fails to apply the
court’s newfound willingness to aggressively police the boundary between recklessness and intent. See id.
at 605 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).  That Judge Rosenblatt’s opinion in Payne is the vehicle employed by the
Campbell panel to conduct a Sanchez-style analysis is ironic given Judge Rosenblatt’s dissent from
Sanchez. Compare People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 269–280 (2004), with Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d at 394
(Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
95. See  People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294 (2006).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 295.
99. In Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588 (2006), the people argued that by shooting the victim in a “public
place, an urban bus stop,” Policano had endangered the victim’s friend, and thus, that “a reasonable trier
of fact could easily find that [a] defendant [who] fired his gun in a bus stop on a public street with other
people present demonstrated” the necessary mental states to sustain a depraved indifference murder con-
viction. Id. at 593, 601.  Such an argument is indistinguishable from that made by the appellate division
in Campbell.  Compare Policano, 7 N.Y.3d 588 with People v. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (2d
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in Campbell was wrong when it held that “[u]nder these circumstances [that]
the decedent was simply in the company of two other men [at the time of his
murder] this case fits into the narrow category of cases where depraved indiffer-
ence murder properly applies.”100  Therefore, in relying upon Fenner, which de-
pended on the continued validity of Register and Sanchez, this comment
contends that this jurisprudence has been swept up with the remaining vestiges
of the pre-Feingold era, and it follows that the appellate division erred in rely-
ing thereon.101
In conclusion, the theory adopted by the appellate division in Campbell “is
flawed and reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the concepts underlying
depraved indifference murder.”102  In this case, the defendant accosted a group of
men to inquire about the location of a man who might have been involved in the
stabbing of his brother the night before.103  After receiving an obviously unsatis-
factory response, he proceeded, for no apparent reason, to shoot at the group with
sufficient aim to hit a fleeing man in the back of the head while smiling in
delight.104  These actions do not establish that the defendant was “indifferent” to
the victim’s plight in any sense of the word.  On the contrary, the cowardly act of
shooting at a group of fleeing men did not “recklessly creat[e] a grave risk of
death,” but rather “creat[ed] a virtual certainty of death born of an intent to
kill.”105  The appellate division erred in holding that a rational jury could infer
otherwise.  Rather than affirming the conviction, the appellate division should
have reversed the judgment of the supreme court.106
Dep’t. 2006).  While “[t]hese arguments carried the day” in Policano  at the appellate division in 2000,
Policano , 7 N.Y. 3d at 593, the Court of Appeals went on to unanimously hold that “there is no doubt
that under the law of New York today, a jury would not be permitted to find defendant guilty of depraved
indifference murder on the evidence on this record.” Id. at 601 (emphasis added).  Such reasoning applies
with equal force to Campbell.
100. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
101. Indeed, Judge Graffeo, in her dissent from Feingold, insisted that the court was not only overruling
Register and Sanchez, but was also adopting a substantially more strident position than that adopted
even by Suarez, and by implication, Payne’s reliance on Fenner.  People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 305
(2006) (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
102. People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 270 (2004).
103. Campbell, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
104. Id. at 269.
105. People v. Gonzalez, 1 N.Y.3d 464, 468 (2004).
106. See generally People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 416 (2002) (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“[When] no rea-
sonable view of the evidence supports a finding of recklessness, on any level . . . [t]his Court’s only recourse
is to reverse defendant’s conviction of depraved indifference murder and dismiss that count of the
indictment.”).
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